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SOME ALARMING ASPECTS OF THE LEGACIES OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND OF JOHN MARSHALL
STEPHEN B. PRESSER*
My assigned tasks at this Symposium were to speak about the
legacy of judicial review in general, and the legacy of Chief Justice
John Marshall in particular. As originally delivered, my remarks
were divided into two ten-minute discussions on these topics, and
I have combined, revised, and annotated them for this written
version. I begin with the legacy of judicial review, and follow that
with some consideration of John Marshall. Caveat Lector.1 I want
to dissent from the conventional wisdom of the legal academy on
these matters.
JUDICIAL REVIEW: ORIGINALLY REPUBLICAN, NOT DEMOCRATIC
I have to confess that I am more than a little at a loss to know
what to say about the legacy of judicial review. Let us start with a
definition. For our purposes, "judicial review" is the practice of the
courts reviewing and, if necessary, declaring unlawful, the conduct
of the executive and legislative branches of the federal government,
and all three branches of the state governments. This practice
seems to be the U.S. Constitution's ultimate device for securing
federalism and the separation of powers. For me, then, a law
professor with just short of three decades experience teaching and
writing about American law, to ruminate on the legacy of judicial
review is a bit like being asked to comment on the legacy of our
being air-breathers. In the Americanjudicial system, devoted as we
claim to be to the rule of law and the notion that ours is a
* Raoul Berger Professor of Legal History, Northwestern University School of Law;
Professor of Business Law, Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern
University; Associate Research Fellow, Institute of United States Studies, University of
London.
1. By which I mean, of course, "Let the reader beware."
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government of laws, not men, I cannot imagine an alternative to
judicial review. Then again, there have been plenty of cultures that
have done without it. Until recently, for example, the civil law
tradition managed just fine without judicial review, thank you very
much,2 but if you have followed events in Europe recently, you know
that the European Court of Justice has gotten very much into it, so
judicial review may be becoming a universal phenomenon.3
This may not be all to the good, however, because the modern
conception of judicial review seems to differ from what Alexander
Hamilton had in mind in The Federalist No. 78,' to say nothing of
what Marshall intended in McCulloch,5 but probably not in
Marbury.6 Indeed, some of the literature on human rights and some
of the decisions of international judicial bodies that I recently have
looked at read human rights protocols' expansively to remove
governing power from legislatures and sovereign nations.' These
2. On the civil law tradition see generally JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW
TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN
AMERICA (1969).
3. For a discussion of the emergence ofjudicial review as a means ofpreserving the rule
of law in the European Union, and its correspondence with the American model as developed
under Chief Justice Marshall, see generally Herbert A. Johnson, Judicial Institutions in
Emerging Federal Systems: The Marshall Court and the European Court of Justice, 33 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 1063 (2000).
4. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
5. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
6. Marburyv. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). InMarbury, Marshall was making
an orthodox, indeed a conservative, statement ofludicial review's use in implementing the
popular will as expressed in the Constitution, but in McCulloch, Marshall was using judicial
review as a way of expansively stretching the meaning of the Constitution, probably beyond
what its Framers intended. For an extended discussion of this argument, see Stephen B.
Presser, Marbury, McCulloch, Gore and Bush: A Comment on Sylvia Snowiss, 33 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 1157 (2000); see also, Sylvia Snowiss, Text and Principle in John
Marshall's Constitutional Law: The Cases of Marbury and McCulloch, 33 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 973 (2000) (examining differences in the application of text and principle in the two
cases).
7. A frne introduction to the problematic nature ofthe concept of"human rights" as used
in the late twentieth century and a comprehensive review of the literature on human rights
is Makau wa Mutua, The Ideology of Human Rights, 36 VA. J. INTL L. 589 (1996).
8. For the theory that national sovereignty ought to give way before international law
norms see, for example, Ronald A. Brand, The Role of International Law in the Twenty-First
Century: External Sovereignty and International Law, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1685 (1995)
and sources there cited. For further discussion of this theory, see, for example, Philippe
Sands, Lecture: Turtles and Torturers: The Transformation of International Law, 33 N.Y.U.
J. INT'L L. & POL. 527 (2001).
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decisions remind me of the Warren Court, the Burger Court, or the
Rehnquist Court when they were in the business of manufacturing
new constitutional rights, and taking power away from states and
localities.9
But if The Federalist No. 78 makes any sense, I think, it is
because it expresses a single clear, objective, and limited notion of
judicial review."° Hamilton's argument, ostensibly adopted by
Marshall in Marbury, was that judicial review was a conservative
doctrine, the purpose of which was to limit the legislature, the
states, and the executive to the exercise of the clearly defined and
originally limited powers granted to them by the sovereign people."
Judicial review was not to be a license for judicial lawmaking as it
has become in our time and as it has been celebrated by most of us
in the academy. I am out of the academic mainstream here, because
I like the original conservative conception ofjudicial review, and am
horrified by what the Supreme Court has done, at least since the
New Deal, to aggrandize the federal government, to limit the power
of states and localities, and to create utter uncertainty as to the
meaning of constitutional provisions.' 2
I am a simple person, a simple Midwestern provincial law
professor, and I subscribe to the simple notion that the only thing
that should guide our understanding of the Constitution is the
meaning that it had in 1789 when originally drafted, or the
meaning of amendments as they were understood when they were
passed. Raoul Berger gave my chair to Northwestern, and I share
his originalist views.'" I think the Supreme Court's opinions that
incorporate the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment are
judicial usurpations," and I disagree with everything from the
9. See generally STEPHEN B. PRESSER, RECAPTURING THE CONSTITUTION: RACE,
RELIGION, AND ABORTION RECONSIDERED (1994) [hereinafter PRESSER, RECAPTURING THE
CONSTITUTION]. For a comparison of what is happening at the international level to what
happened in American courts, see generally Stephen B. Presser, "Liberty UnderLaw" Under
Siege, 45 ORBIS: A JOURNAL OF WORLD AFFAIRS 357 (2001).
10. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
11. For this reading of The Federalist No. 78, see, for example, PRESSER, RECAPTURING
THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, at 77-82.
12. See generally id.
13. For Berger's originalist views see, for example, RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY
JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (2d ed. 1997).
14. See PRESSER, RECAPTURING THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, at 160-63; see also
149720021
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school prayer decisions15 to Planned Parenthood v. Casey.'6 While
I think Brown v. Board ofEducation"7 was correct to outlaw racially
segregated schools, it is because I believe that the Fourteenth
Amendment can legitimately be read as intending to create a color-
blind Constitution: all governmentally sponsored racial
classifications, even for affirmative action or diversity purposes, are
unconstitutional."8 My views, in other words, differ so drastically
from those of any other contributor to this Symposium that I
wonder what limited use my comments have for any of you.
Still, maybe it does not hurt to speak from the perspective of a
convinced conservative originalist, because that is still the view
that the courts virtually always claim to be applying, and it is also
the view that Congress claimed to be following in the recent Clinton
impeachment fiasco. So, at some level, probably around our legal
genomes, so to speak, we are programmed to be originalists, and we
understand that there is something a bit illegitimate about any
other perspective. This is not to say that those who claim we cannot
reproduce the historical understanding are wholly without merit,
but I think we can do a pretty good job, or I would not be in the
business I am in, occupying the chair that I do. 9 All the same,
however, how can I take the positions I do, if virtually no other
practicing historian in the legal academy does?
It is because I think that originalism and the original conception
ofjudicial review still have a lot to teach us. I have never been a big
fan of diversity,20 for example, because I think we have yet to get
uniformity right. So what was the original understanding ofjudicial
BERGER, supra note 13, at 157-86 (explaining the lack of historical evidence for the
"incorporation" theory).
15. E.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
16. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
17. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
18. See generally PRESSER, RECAPTURING THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, at 179-92,
203-14, 219-25.
19. For a comprehensive refutation of the critics who contend that recovery of the
original understanding cannot be accomplished, and constructive reasons why it can, see
generally KEITH E. WHITrINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING,
ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REvIEW 47-109, 161-212 (1999).
20. Essentially, I share the reservations expressed in Paul D. Carrington, Diversity!, 4
UTAH L. REv. 1105 (1992) (arguing that quotas and other forms of mandated diversity




review all about? What was this simple, clear, uniform conception
that I have posited supposed to be, and how could a smart fellow
like Hamilton and, even in 1789, Jefferson, be enamored of the
idea? You will remember that Jefferson turned around on this
issue, but, in 1789, his correspondence indicates that he was all for
it.
2 1
What were the Federalists thinking in 1789? What justified
judicial review? Again, if we look at The Federalist No. 78, and
consider it on its own terms, it was popular sovereignty."
Supposedly, when the justices kept state and federal lawmakers
and officials within bounds it was to be within the bounds set by the
people when they, by the act of their sovereign will, adopted the
Constitution. Under this view, the justices were merely the agents
of the people. Popular sovereignty was the only acceptable theory
for American government in 1789, as it had been since we made the
break with Great Britain in 1776, so this justification for judicial
review is not surprising.23 But what passed for popular sovereignty
back then is not the same as what passes for democracy now, and
perhaps that is the legacy we should be exploring. We start with the
proposition that the "people" who endorsed the Federal Constitution
included no women, no blacks, and very few of everybody else, since
the franchise was, at that time, virtually universally limited to
property holders. This has led many of us to conclude that in our
modern era we ought to forget about the Framers altogether, since
we live in more democratic and less elitist times.
21. Compare, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Mar. 15, 1789), in
THE PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON 438, 438 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1975) ("In the
arguments in favor of a declaration of rights [in the new federal constitution], you omit one
which has great weight with me, the legal check which it puts into the hands of the judiciary.
This is a body, which if rendered independent, and kept strictly to their own department
merits great confidence for their learning and integrity.") with Letter from Thomas Jefferson
to Thomas Richie (Dec. 25, 1820), in 12 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 175, 177 (Paul
Leicester Ford ed., 1905) ("The judiciary of the United States is the subtle corps of sappers
and miners constantly working under ground to undermine the foundations of our
confederated fabric. They are construing our constitution from a co-ordination of a general
and special government to a general and supreme one alone.").
22. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
23. On the political and ideological movements that made popular sovereignty the only
acceptable basis for American government, see generally GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION
OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 344-89 (1969).
20021 1499
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:1495
I am not so sure, though. I think it is still useful to remember
how popular sovereignty differs from democracy, at least in the
conception held by our Framers. I am not prepared, in this day and
age, to mount a campaign for the narrowing of the franchise, but I
think it is useful, occasionally, to remember how the Framers could
simultaneously seriously believe in both popular sovereignty and a
limited franchise. The clue, I think, is in what we called, in history
departments fifteen years ago, "Republicanism": the set of
principles that elucidated Republican government and was
concerned with fostering civic virtue in the American people. The
legal academy never really understood "Republicanism,"24 and as
explicated by people like Cass Sunstein25 and Frank Michelman"
it sounded suspiciously like Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal rather
than ideas held by Hamilton, Madison, Jay, and Marshall. Even
historians have now figured out that the late eighteenth century in
the newly formed United States was as much about Lockean
liberalism and Protestant Christianity' as it was about the
"Republican" ideals of Harrington and Sidney, Trenchard and
Gordon.29 All the same, the U.S. Constitution, in its "republican"
24. Here I am making an argument essentially similar to that which can be found in G.
Edward White, Recovering the World of the Marshall Court, 33 J.MARSHALLL.REv. 781,791-
807 (2000) (claiming that the Marshall Court's conception of republicanism included ideas
about the difference between the will of the judge and the law, the nature of history, and the
ability of men to control it-ideas very different from current conceptions of republicanism).
25. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988)
(arguing that classical Republicanism was committed to, among other things, political
equality and guaranteed rights of participation by all citizens).
26. See, e.g., Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988) (stating as one
of the central tenets of Republicanism the view that citizenship, meaning participation as an
equal in government, is of primary interest).
27. For the general failure of legally trained writers on the American Constitution to
understand American constitutional history in general and Republicanism in particular see,
for example, Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95
CoLUM. L. REv. 523 (1995).
28. The seminal piece in this regard is James T. Kloppenberg, The Virtues ofLiberalism:
Christianity, Republicanism, and Ethics in Early American Political Discourse, 74 J. AM.
HIST. 9 (1987).
29. For the development of the understanding among American historians of
"Republicanism," an understanding which included consideration of the English thinkers
mentioned in the text and one that predated and was always more sophisticated than that
among most law professors, see generally Robert E. Shalhope, Republicanism and Early
American Historiography, 39 WM. & MARY Q. 334 (1982), and Robert E. Shalhope, Toward
a Republican Synthesis: The Emergence ofan Understanding ofRepublicanism in American
1500
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structure, as the late twentieth-century Federalist Society has been
trying to tell us, does have some lessons for us, a legacy we should
consider and perhaps even emulate. As The Federalist Papers,
published in the late eighteenth century, tell us, the idea behind the
Federal Constitution was one of creating a republican structure in
which government was removed from direct democracy. 0 The
indirect election of the president and senators was calculated to
produce persons of virtue who could make difficult decisions
without bowing to popularity, and in a manner that would preserve
the rights and interests of the community, rather than reflecting
narrow personal or partisan concerns.3
I do not know how well this ever worked, but I do think that
Marshall himself, at some level, was committed to republican
rather than democratic ideals, and his opinion in the Dartmouth
College3" case, his jeremiad against the New Hampshire
legislature's attempt to democratize the college by subjecting it to
popular legislative control, suggests as much.3 If you read The
Federalist Papers carefully, and-let us be honest-after more than
200 years, it is still recognized as the best guide to Constitutional
interpretation we have, you see repeated praise of the Constitution
for giving discretion to officials whose purported sense of virtue and
honor will lead them to act appropriately, lest they suffer the
disgrace and ignominy of impeachment.34
Unfortunately, as those of us who tried to explain the matter to
the House of Representatives and Senate a couple of years ago
found out, even if honor and virtue were important to the Framers,
Historiography, 29 WlNM. & MARY Q. 49 (1972).
30. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 126-27 (James Madison) (Penguin Books ed.,
1987) (exploring the advantages of a republican form of government over direct democracy).
31. See id.; see also THEFEDERALISTNO. 76, at430 (AlexanderHamilton) (PenguinBooks
ed., 1987) (discussing the president's appointment power, and indicating that the
independence of senators, and the necessity of getting their concurrence for appointments,
will operate as a check on the president, and will tend "to prevent the appointment of unfit
characters from State prejudice, from family connection, from personal attachment, or from
a view to popularity").
32. Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
33. Id.
34. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 64, at 380 (John Jay) (Penguin Books ed., 1987)
(indicating that Senators voting on treaties will be likely to behave as men of talent and
integrity because of their sense of "honor, oaths, reputations, conscience, the love of country,
and family affections and attachments" and the threat of impeachment).
15012002]
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they were of little or no importance to current House Democrats
and even current Senate Republicans, and a President sorely
lacking in both was not removed, even though that is what
impeachment is for."5 The pardon power, as Hamilton tells us in
The Federalist No. 74, was given to the President because he was
supposed to be a person of "prudence and good sense,"36 which I
take to be a person concerned with honor and possessing virtue.
Those of us who argued for the impeachment of Clinton recently got
a good chance to say if not "we told you so," then "we told you why"
when the recent batch of unpardonable pardons and clemencies
came down.
3 7
The point here is that judicial review, and the Constitution itself,
I think, were premised on a notion of government that required
some insulation from democracy. A nation now obsessed with direct
democracy, and that insists on popularity as the only valid basis for
choosing presidents and senators, is probably not going to be
playing the governmental game exactly the way Marshall and the
Framers intended. The Warren Court, and its followers on the
Burger and Rehnquist courts, were intoxicated by direct democracy,
and all but forgot the essentially aristocratic premises, the
notions of virtue and honor, that were part of our original
republicanism." It was hardly their fault, since the so-called
35. See generally, Stephen B. Presser, Would George Washington Have Wanted Bill
Clinton Impeached?, 67 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 666, 676-81 (1999) (arguing that if the facts as
alleged by Kenneth Starr were true, then the Framers would have wanted Bill Clinton
removed from office); Stephen B. Presser, The Ordinary, The Exceptional, The Corrupt And
The Moral: What Did The Impeachment Of Bill Clinton Mean For America and Americans?,
17 CONST. COMMENT 149 (2000) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, AN AFFAIR OF STATE: THE
INVESTIGATION, IMPEACHMENT, AND TRIAL OF PRESIDENT CLINTON (1999)) (arguing that
Posner got it wrong, and Clinton should have been removed).
36. THE FEDERALIST No. 74, at 423 (Alexander Hamilton) (Penguin Books ed., 1987).
37. For the suggestion that the pardons of people like Marc Rich, and other assorted
cronies and miscreants were not the sort of conduct the Framers had in mind, see, for
example, Stephen B. Presser, Cultural Revolution, 25 CHRONICLES: A MAGAZINE OF
AMERICAN CULTURE 8 (Apr., 2000). For criticism of Clinton's actions in pardoning Rich and
others, see Lisa Anderson, Clinton Has a Knack for Taking Lows to New Heights; He's Just
5 Weeks out of Office, but Alleged Sins Keep Multiplying, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 26, 2001, at Cl;
Clinton's Unpardonable Action, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2001, at M4; Clinton's Unpardonable
Pardons, FORT LAUDERDALE SUN-SENTINEL, Jan. 26, 2001, at A24; William Safire, Isn't it
Rich?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2001, at A23; David Tell, Unpardonable, WKLY. STANDARD, Feb.
26,2001, at 9.
38. See PRESSER, RECAPTURING THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, at 170-99.
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"Progressive Amendments" that brought us a redistributive income
tax,3 9 direct election of senators," and prohibition,41 among other
evils, may well have transformed this country, at a constitutional
level, into something Marshall and the Framers would have
abhorred.42
To be consistent I ought to advocate the repeal of all the post-
Reconstruction Amendments, but I am not prepared to go that far,
and, after all, I have been one of the most vocal supporters of the
Flag Protection Amendment, which I still expect to pass sooner or
later.' Still, the legacy of judicial review ought to be to remind us
that it was originally a tool in the service of a republican and not a
democratic Constitution, devoted to the protection of property and
contract rights, and devoted to preventing state legislatures from
suspending debts and issuing paper money." Holmes was, of
course, quite wrong when he dissented in Lochner45 on the grounds
that a constitution embraces no particular economic or political
theory. Ours did, and the Lochner majority basically got it right, as
we are now beginning to understand.46 That is judicial review for
you. So as we ruminate on judicial review, and the legacy of
Marbury,47 we ought to consider that, at least as originally
understood, it was anything but a progressive doctrine, and that the
legacy of the progressives might well yield Bill Clinton and Marc
Rich, and not a future John Marshall.
39. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
40. U.S. CONST. amend XVII.
41. U.S. CONST. amend XVIII. (repealed 1933).
42. Lest the implication that Marshall would have had some problems with the
Eighteenth Amendment be doubted, see Jean Edward Smith, Marshall Misconstrued:
Activist? Partisan? Reactionary?, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1109, 1109 (2000) (noting
Marshall's "unquenchable thirst for Madeira").
43. On the flag amendment, and the wisdom ofcurrent amendment efforts, see generally
Stephen B. Presser, ConstitutionalAmendments:Dangerous Threat orDemocracy inAction?,
5 T_ x REv. L. & POL. 209 (2000).
44. For more on these purposes of the Federal Constitution see generally WOOD, supra
note 23, at 503-16.
45. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting), overruled in
part by Day-Brite Lighting Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952), and overruled in part by
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1993).
46. On the coherent and historically accurate theory of Lochner, and how Holmes got it
wrong, see, for example, PRESSER, RECAPTURINGTHE CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, at 139-43.
47. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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JOHN MARSHALL: WHICH ONE? BETTER OR WORSE THAN CHASE?
That brings me to my second set of alarming observations, those
concerning the legacy of John Marshall himself. What, then, is the
legacy of John Marshall, assuming that it is not judicial review, on
which I have already touched? To be honest, the legacy of John
Marshall could not be judicial review, because it is clear to anybody
who consults the historical record that Marshall, in Marbury, was
simply invoking the doctrines ofjudicial review set out by Hamilton
in The Federalist No. 78, and many others before and after.4" But if
we search for the legacy of John Marshall the man, the first
problem that we encounter is that there are probably lots of John
Marshalls, which introduces the possibility of multiple legacies.
There is the John Marshall who allegedly wanted to keep the Court
out of politics49 (somehow I think he did not leave much of a legacy);
48. See, e.g., JOSEPH H. SMIrH, APPEALS TO THE PRIVY COUNCIL FROM THE AMERICAN
PLANTATIONS (1965) (making the case that these colonial appeals were the precursors of
American judicial review); Presser, supra note 6, at 1158 (supplementing Snowiss's listing
with Thomas Hutchinson's 1768 criticism of American ideas about having judges refuse to
enforce immoral laws or laws contrary to the purposes of government); Jack N. Rakove, The
Origins ofJudicial Review: A Plea forNew Contexts, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1031 (1997) (exploring
the sources of judicial review before Marbury v. Madison); Snowiss, supra note 6, at 979
(providing examples of the articulation of the theory and practice ofjudicial review by James
Iredell, James Wilson, Spencer Roane, Saint George Tucker, and William Paterson, allbefore
Marbury). For a comprehensive study of the relationship between Marbury and judicial
review, see ROBERT LOWRY CLINTON, MARBURY V. MADISON AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 117-25
(1989).
49. The principal work supporting this contention is probably 2 GEORGE LEE HASKINS &
HERBERT A. JOHNSON, FOUNDATIONS OF POWER: JOHN MARSHALL, 1801-1815 (1981). For
skepticism about whether this account squares with reality see, for example, Jennifer
Nedelsky, ConfiningDemocratic Politics:Anti-Federalists, Federalists, and the Constitution,
96 HARV. L. REV. 340 (1982) (book review). In any event, in the late twentieth and early
twenty-first century, it is impossible to argue that the dominant perception is anything but
the clear infusion of politics into law and judging, illustrated by the lamentable effort now
underway to subject judicial appointees to ideological litmus tests. See, e.g., Richard Bond,
The Senate's Hidden Power: Ideology Taints Judicial Appointments, WASH. TIMES, June 5,
2001, at A19; Editorial, Stop Pretending Judges'Ideologies Don't Matter, NEWSDAY, June 28,
2001, at A40; Edward Walsh, Panel Debates Senate Role on Court Choices; Clash on
Ideology's Place Reflects Battles to Come, WASH. POST, June 27, 2001, at A23. Along with a
couple of other brave stalwarts I tried to make the case in Washington, before Senator
Schumer's committee (he is the point man on the effort to take ideology into consideration
for judicial appointments) that rather than ideology, the only relevant thing about a nominee
is his or her adherence to the notion that judges should not legislate, but should instead
implement the rule of law. See generally Ideology and Judicial Nominations: Hearing on
1504
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there is the John Marshall who broadly expounded, or perhaps
expanded the Constitution in McCulloch, who went on to become
the patron saint of the "switch in time that saved nine," the
"judicial revolution of 1937,"5o as well as of the Warren Court;5 and
then there is the John Marshall of Fletcher v. Peck52 and Dartmouth
College,53 who believed in property and contract rights,54 and who
might well have inspired the "Four Horsemen" in their resistance
to Franklin Roosevelt.
I do not know much about any of those Marshalls, however. The
real reason I was invited to participate in this Symposium is
because I once spent some time studying the pre-Marshall Court in
general and Samuel Chase in particular.55 Perhaps the most
important legacy of John Marshall is that he was, by definition,
something different from the pre-Marshall Court. While we glory in
Marshall's anniversary, however, I thought it might be worthwhile
to remember what it was he moved away from, or perhaps what he
obscured. The point here is that there was a lot in the pre-Marshall
'Should Ideology Matter?: Judicial Nominations 2001" Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Cts., 107th Cong. (2001) (testimony of
Stephen B. Presser, Raoul Berger Prof. of Legal Hist., Northwestern Univ. Sch. of Law),
available at http-/judiciary.senate.govl%7Ejudiciary/oldsite/te062601Pre.htm. Senator
Schumer appeared unconvinced. See, e.g., Joyce Purnick, Ideology? Well, Who's to Judge?,
N.Y. TIMEs, July 2,2001, at BI (indicating that Presser's view was differentfrom Schumer's).
50. James W. Ely, Jr., The Marshall Court and Property Rights: A Reappraisal, 33 J.
MARSHALLL. REV. 1023, 1024 (2000) ("In a particularly unhistorical twist, some supporters
of the New Deal even presented Marshall as a kind of forerunner of modern liberalism.").
51. STEPHEN B. PRESSER, THE ORIGINAL MISUNDERSTANDING: THE ENGLISH, THE
AMERIcANs AND THE DIALECTIC OF FEDERALIST JURISPRUDENCE 172 (1991) [hereinafter
PRESSER, THE ORIGINAL MISUNDERSTANDING] (commenting on the habit of scholars "to use
John Marshall's supposed greatness to legitimize United States Supreme Court actions since
the 'Constitutional Revolution' of 1937," including not only those of the New Deal Court, but
also those of the Warren Court).
52. 10 U.S. 87 (1810).
53. Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 518 (1819).
54. For thoughts on this John Marshall, see, for example, ROBERT KENNETHFAULKNER,
THE JURISPRUDENCE OF JOHN MARSHALL 20-33 (1968) (analyzing Marshall's understanding
of the foundational role of private property for economic growth), and Ely, supra note 50
(reassessing, articulating, and praising Marshall's commitment to property and contract
rights as essential features of his constitutionalism).
55. The principal resultwas PRESSER, THE ORIGINALMISUNDERSTANDING, supra note 51.
My views on Chase are further set forth in Stephen B. Presser, Et tu, Raoul? Or The Original
Misunderstanding Misunderstood, 1991 BYUL. REV. 1475, and in Stephen B. Presser, The
Verdict on Samuel Chase and his "Apologist," in SERIATIM: THE SUPREME COURT BEFORE
JOHN MARSHALL 260 (Scott Douglas Gerber ed., 1998).
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Court that also forms part of our constitutional legacy, and that,
while we celebrate Marshall, we should still remember the
continuing influence of the Supreme Court before him.56
So I thought I would take a few pages to do that, and, in
particular, to say something about Samuel Chase, whom Marshall
clearly was not. Like everybody else who had to deal with Chase, I
suppose Marshall was politely exasperated with him during the
eleven years that they were together on the Court. Everybody, then
and now, seems to have loathed Chase in one form or anotherY
Chase, you will remember, is the only United States Supreme Court
Justice ever to have been impeached, and is usually regarded as the
"American Jeffreys,""8 a partisan bully, or worse. 9 Chase was the
most famous enforcer of the Alien and Sedition Acts, and it is said
he loved nothing better than to send a Jeffersonian scribbler to
federal prison, which a contemporary newspaper, the Philadelphia
Aurora, called Chase's "repository of Republicans.""° For the last
fifty years almost no one has had a kind word to say about Chase,
which was enough for me to find him irresistible.
As it turns out, if you look into the record you do find that Chase
was not without human failings. Alexander Hamilton, no less, in
what may have been his first use of the pseudonym Publius,
denounced Chase for cornering the flour futures market during the
Revolutionary War, when our troops needed bread, and when
56. For introductions to the work ofthe pre-Marshall justices, see generally, WILLIAMR.
CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLYREPUBLIC: THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIPS OF JOHN JAY
AND OLIVER ELLSWORTH (1995); 1 JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801 (1971); SERIATIM: THE SUPREME
COURT BEFORE JOHN MARSHALL (Scott Douglas Gerber ed., 1998).
57. My favorite comment in this regard is that of Richard Peters, the United States
District Judge for Pennsylvania who sat with Chase in some of his most notorious court
cases: "Of all others. ... I like the least to be coupled with him (Chase]. I never sat with him
without pain, as he was forever getting into some intemperate and unnecessary squabble."
PRESSER, THE ORIGINAL MISUNDERSTANDING, supra note 51, at 11 (quoting 1 CHARLES
WARREN, THE SUPREME COURTINUNITED STATES HISTORY 281 (rev. ed. 1926) (quoting Letter
from Richard Peters to Timothy Pickering (Jan. 24, 1804))).
58. Id. at 13 (quotingRICHARDE. ELLIS,THEJEFFERSONIANCRISIS: COURTSANDPOLITICS
IN THE YOUNG REPUBLIC,79 (1971)).
59. For a summary of and citations to the litany of criticism of Chase, see id. at 4-5.
60. Id. at 5. Here the term"Republican" means an adherent to the tenets of the emerging
Jeffersonian "Democratic/Republicans" as distinguished from the Adams' "Federalists," and
not the generic use of "republican" as meaning something distinguished from "democratic,"
as employed in the first part of this Essay. No one said this was not going to be confusing.
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Chase, as a Congressman, had advance confidential word that there
was going to be a massive Army purchase of flour.6" And it is true
that while he was a sitting Supreme Court Justice Chase actively
campaigned for John Adams.62 To my mind, however, Chase was
more consistent than Marshall at upholding what was to become a
set of American judicial ideals.
It was Chase's exposition of The Federalist No. 78 in the 1800
Callender63 case (with Marshall in the audience) that was
reproduced, almost word for word, in Marbury.64 During Chase's
impeachment trial, Marshall, whom Chase had counted on to
support him with regard to his conduct at the Callender trial, was
rather wishy-washy on the stand. In addition, at almost the same
time, Marshall, who gets all the credit for judicial review, actually
put pen to paper to confess that maybe Congress should have the
last word on judging unconstitutionality." Almost no one ever
remembers these incidents, but under pressure at the time of the
Chase impeachment, when strong men should have been standing
firm in defense of the rule of law, Marshall waffled. When the
Jeffersonians passed their 1802 Judiciary Act, which repealed the
Federalists' Midnight Judges Act and removed all the new federal
circuit judges from their benches, Chase wrote Marshall and the
other Supreme Court justices that this was an unconstitutional
removal of judges without the benefit of impeachment,66 and that
the Court had to take a stand against it, but Marshall meekly let it
pass. Mull that over for a while, by the way, to see if Chase did not
get it right. The Jeffersonians said, "Oh, no, we're not removing
judges, we're just removing judicial positions," but is that really
consistent with the structure of the Constitution? If the
Jeffersonians were right, of course, then Franklin Roosevelt did not
really need his court-packing plan at all-he should have just
61. Id. at25.
62. Id. at 4-5.
63. United States v. Callender, 25 F. Cas. 239 (C.C.D. Va. 1800) (No. 14,709).
64. PRESSER, THE ORIGINAL MISUNDERSTANDING, supra note 51, at 242 n.42.
65. 3 ALBERT BEVERIDGE, THE LwE OF JoHN MARSHALL 176-79 (1919).
66. PRESSER, THE ORIGINAL MISUNDERSTANDING, supra note 51, at 163 (citing Letter
from Samuel Chase to John Marshall (Apr. 24, 1802) (on file with the New York Historical
Society)).
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gotten Congress to reduce the number of Supreme Court justices,
and booted out the Four Horsemen,67 but I digress.
Chase was the only United States Supreme Court Justice until
well into Madison's term who boldly rejected the federal common
law of crimes, an issue on which Marshall was strangely silent.6"
And, interestingly enough, Chase, in Calder v. Bull, 9 equally boldly
advocated a jurisprudence based on transcendent principles of
republicanism, a jurisprudence which claimed that no matter what
was in a written constitution, no government that called itself
republican could tolerate ex post facto laws, the expropriation of
private property, or parties being allowed to act as judges in their
own cases. Here, though it was couched in terms of what a republic
required, Chase was simply reflecting the overarching maxims of
the common law championed by no less an authority than Sir
Edward Coke himself.70 These were principles that restricted the
national and state legislatures in the interests of protecting liberty
and property, just as Chase's view on the common law of crimes was
designed to protect citizens from an overweening government. The
Marshall in McCulloch, at least, cleared the path for just the kind
of powerful central government Chase feared.
Chase and his pre-Marshall fellows also seemed to believe, as
Chase's Baltimore Grand Jury Charge (an element in his im-
peachment) indicated, that there could be no order without law, no
law without morality, and no morality without religion, and that
it was the job of the justices to remind the rest of America of
these timeless truths.71 These pre-Marshall justices, as Robert
Lerner wrote many years ago, believed they were "Republican
67. This argument is made in Presser, Et tu, Raoul?, supra note 55, at 1486.
68. On the controversy over the federal common law of crimes in general, and Chase's
views in particular, see, for example, PRESSER, THE ORIGINAL MISUNDERSTANDING, supra
note 51, at 76-98.
69. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798). For an analysis of Chase's views in this case see, for
example, PRESSER, THE ORIGINAL MISUNDERSTANDING, supra note 51 at 41-43; Ely, supra
note 50, at 1028-29; John V. Orth, Taking From A and Giving to B: Substantive Due Process
and the Case of the Shifting Paradigm, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 337 (1997).
70. Cf Dr. Bonham's Case, 8 Co. Rep. 113b, l18a, 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652 (K.B. 1610)
(establishing principle that no one should be judge and party in his own case, and indicating
the role of common law in adjudging acts of Parliament to be without force).
71. See, e.g., PRESSER, THE ORIGINAL MISUNDERSTANDING, supra note 51, at 141-49,
PRESSER, RECAPTURING THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, at 84-97.
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schoolmasters,"72 and thought it was part of their responsibility to
lecture Americans on sensible political, economic, moral, and
religious principles. In Chase's Baltimore Grand Jury charge he
also railed against widening the franchise to include those without
a serious stake in the community (as Maryland had recently done),
and threw in attacks on Maryland's recent abolition of one of its
courts, and the Jeffersonians' repeal of the Midnight Judges Act for
good measure.73 Marshall, it was said, was not "fond of butting [his
head] against a wall in sport,"74 and he seems, at least in the first
part of the nineteenth century, to have avoided openly challenging
Jeffersonian usurpations.
But I must give credit where credit is due. Marshall did the right
thing in Fletcher v. Peck, in Dartmouth College, in Gibbons v.
Ogden,7 and maybe in lots of other cases of his that I do not even
know. I am not quite ready to prostrate myself at the altar of
Marshall worship, however, and I wonder if the kind of judicial
deification of Marshall that we have perpetuated for the last sixty-
five years or so is really healthy. For most of us, I daresay, Marshall
stands in as a proxy for the notion that the courts are the best
lawmakers, the Supreme Court in particular, and that the job of the
courts is to fit the Constitution to the Age.
This is probably the dominant religion among most current legal
academics, but Marshall worship obscures the continuing validity
of a separate set of postulates-to wit, that if you want the
Constitution to change you amend it, that it is the job of the courts
to apply law, not to make it, and that it is for the legislatures to
promulgate new legal rules. Marshall worship also obscures the fact
that most of our legal and constitutional history was not made by
United States Supreme Court Justices, but by state judges, by
lower federal court judges, by state and federal legislatures, and by
practicing lawyers, administrative agencies, and all the other
72. Robert Lerner, The Supreme Court as Republican Schoolmaster, 1967 SUP. CT. REV.
127.
73. For the text of Chase's Baltimore Grand Jury Charge see STEPHEN B. PRESSER &
JAMiL S. ZAiNALDIN, LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN AMERICAN HISTORY 224-26 (4th ed. 2000).
74. R. KENTNEWmiYER, SUPREME COURTJUSTICE JOSEPH STORY: STATFSMAN OFTHE OLD
REPUBLIC 205 (1985) (quotingLetterfromJohnMarshallto Justice Story (Sept. 26,1823) (on
file with Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston)).
75. 22 U.S. 1 (9 Wheat.) (1824).
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people and institutions that Willard Hurst urged us to study a
generation or so ago.76 1 am not sure whether we have come here to
praise Marshall, and I really have no wish to bury him, but he still
makes me nervous. I am not as sure as I would like to be that he
really cared all that much for the rule of law,7 and while it is
undeniable that he was brilliant, in his judicial opinions, at least,
one usually searches in vain for the kind of scholarship or
luminously articulated philosophy78 that one finds in the opinions
of Story79 or even of Chase."°
CONCLUSION: TWO STRANDS OF CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE
Let me close by putting it slightly differently. For me, John
Marshall, or at least the Marshall of McCulloch, represents one
strand in our constitutional history: an instrumentalist, positivist,
centralizing, judicial supremacist strand, one less concerned with
principle and precedent, and more concerned with expedience.8 For
76. For Hurst's titanic contribution to American legal history, and his philosophy of
writing it, see, for example, Robert W. Gordon, Introduction: J. Willard Hurst and the
Common Law Tradition in American Legal Historiography, 10 LAW & Socy REv. 9, 44-55
(1975).
77. For my difficulties with the question of whether Marshall believed as strongly in the
rule oflaw as Chase did see PRESSER, THE ORIGINAL MISUNDERSTANDING, supra note 51, at
162-69.
78. For a fascinating rumination on this problem, which concludes with the suggestion
that Marshall's jurisprudence was deeply imbued with natural-law thinking, but inamanner
that eludes current scholars, see Robert Lowry Clinton, Classical Legal Naturalism and The
Politics ofJohnMarshall's Constitutional Jurisprudence, 33 J.MARESHALLL.REV. 935,959-68
(2000).
79. For a discussion ofStory'sjudicialphilosophy see NEWMYER, supra note 74, at 205-11.
See generally JAMES MCCLELLAN, JOSEPH STORYAND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: A STUDY
IN POLITICAL AND LEGAL THOUGHT (1990).
80. See generally PRESSER, THE ORIGINAL MISUNDERSTANDING, supra note 51.
81. The qualifier in the text, "at least the Marshall of McCulloch," is an important one.
One can make out a case that Marshall was a proponent of natural law, of the great
principles of republican government, and a champion of property and contract rights that
puts him quite close, on those issues, to the views of Chase, the pre-Marshall justices, and
Joseph Story. Seegenerally, Ely, supra note 50, at 1048-55 (exploring Marshall's commitment
to supra-constitutional principles of a kind that Chase limned in Calder v. Bull). Still, there
were differences between what Story believed in, and to what Marshall was prepared to
commit. Professor Ely notes, for example, that it is likely that Marshall would have broken
with Story over whether vested rights should have been sustained in the Charles River
Bridge case. Id. at 1059.
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me, Chase (and Story) represent another strand, one based in
natural-law ideas running all the way back to Aristotle and Cicero,
and forward through Aquinas and Burke. 2 They saw law as a
conservative force, and one embodying the moral principles and
perhaps even the divine dictates of eternal forces. That is a view out
of favor today, and perhaps that is why Marshall is now a great
favorite. But we are now, and have been since our founding,
involved in a sort of cultural war between these two views,8 and
the nation appears to prosper when both views are held in a sort of
equilibrium. The Marshall/McCulloch view has been in ascendance
for a long time now, and it, or something like it, has played a role
in creating the essentially value-neutral views that now generally
prevail in the legal academy and often in the courts. These views
have led naturally to a law-school trained President-the one who
just left office-who can quibble over what the meaning of "is" is,
and who appeared to regard the prerogatives of his office as a
license to do whatever he pleased, rather than what was in the best
interests of the nation. Bill Clinton was not only not a modern
Republican, he was not an Old Republican. I am sure John
Marshall would not have been proud of him. Still, the Great Chief
Justice, insofar as his legacy has come to be perceived as authority
for an instrumental expedient brand of governing, may have helped
spawn Clinton. I would not obliterate the legacy of John Marshall,
but I would make a bit more room for the legacy of Chase, the pre-
Marshall justices, and Joseph Story.
82. For this strand in Story, see particularly MCCLELLAN, supra note 79, at 69-73.
83. On the ongoing cultural war over these and related issues see, for example, ROBERT
H. BORKc THE TEUPrING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OFTHE LAW 241-50 (1990);
GERTRUDE HIMELFARB, ONE NATION, Two CULTUREs 137-41 (1999). There are those who
see the development of American law as a movement from one set of values to another, a
"transformation" as it were. See also MORTON J. HoRWrTz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LAw 1780-1860 (1977). See, to similar effect, White, supra note 24, at 812-18 and
WOOD, supra note 23, at 91-93. 1 think the evidence indicates not so much a transformation
from one view to another, but an oscillation from one perspective as the dominant one to the
other. The "transformation" analysis seems to be a sort of Whiggish view oflegal history that
might be ripe for questioning. See, e.g., HERBERT BUTITERFIELD, THE WHIG INTERPRETATION
OF HISTORY (reprint ed. 1931).
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